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MEASURES TO CONTROL TOBACCO USE:
IMMUSIITY, ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS, AND
FDA CONTROL AS PROPOSED IN THE FAILED
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Tobacco use is one of the most serious threats to the public health
facing the; United States today.' The United States Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) estimates that 400,000 people die each
year from tobacco-related illnesses.2 In fact, tobacco use alone claims
more lives than AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs,
and suicides combined. It is the single leading cause of preventable
death in this country. As a result, measures to curb the use of tobacco
continue 1:o be'an issue in congressional debates and on the front pages
of major newspapers.
Beginning in June of 1997, the tobacco industry (Industry) and Con-
gress attempted to create a scheme of regulations designed to control
tobacco use. These negotiations began after many states instituted law-
suits against the Industry in an attempt to recover the Medicaid pay-
ments that had been used to provide medical treatment to people suffer-
ing from tobacco-induced diseases.5 On November 7, 1997, Senator
John McCain (R - Arizona) introduced a bill in the Senate, entitled the
"Universal Tobacco Settlement Act," outlining the terms of a proposed
settlement.6 Yet, the bill was never enacted into law. On April 8, 1998,
amid great strife and disagreement, the Industry withdrew from further
1. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396,
44398 (1996).
2. See DHHS Public Health Service, Cigarette Smoking-Related Mortality,
OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH 1, 1 (1995) (reporting that "[e]very year
smoking kills more than 276,000 men and 142,000 women").
3. S3ee Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44398.
4. 3ee DHHS Public Health Service, Cigarette Smoking-Related Mortality,
OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, at 1 (1995).
5. See discussion infra Part II.D. 1.
6. 3ee S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
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negotiations. 7 Not only did the Industry abandon the tobacco settlement,
it also vowed to challenge any future bills proposed by Congress.8
Members of Congress, however, promise to continue the crusade for
tobacco legislation.
9
This Comment focuses on some important measures the failed tobacco
settlement (Failed Settlement) would have implemented and the role
they could play in controlling the use of tobacco. Regardless of whether
Congress continues negotiations with the tobacco industry in the future,
each measure analyzed in this Comment is deserving of attention. Each
measure could have significant repercussions on the tobacco industry as
well as on the way in which tobacco products are manufactured and dis-
tributed. Part I examines current federal legislation's attempt to restrict
tobacco sale and use. Part II explores the option of granting the Industry
immunity from the mounting litigation against it in order to encourage
another settlement proposal in the future. The history of prior lawsuits
brought against tobacco manufacturers will be examined and juxtaposed
against the current wave of lawsuits facing the Industry. Part III dis-
cusses attempts at controlling tobacco use through restrictions on adver-
tising. This part will analyze the constitutionality of the restrictions on
advertising that would have been enacted through the Failed Settlenent.
The analysis will include an historical exploration on the development
of commercial speech as protected by the First Amendment, as well as a
discussion of whether any advertising restriction could pass First
Amendment scrutiny. Part IV examines whether allowing the Food &
Drug Administration (FDA or the Agency) the authority to regulate the
manufacturing and distribution of tobacco products is a viable option. It
will include discussion of how the FDA, for years, refused to assert ju-
risdiction over tobacco products and its recent attempt to control the
Industry by classifying tobacco products as drug-devices. Finally, Part V
is devoted to a summation of each proposition explored. The discussion
will include a conclusion of which measure will serve best the interest
of controlling tobacco, and why other measures will be ineffective or
improper.
7. See John Schwartz, Tobacco Firms Say They'd Rather Fight, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at Al.
8. See id.
9. See id
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I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF CIGARETTES AND SMOKELESS
TOBACCO PRODUCTS
A. Regulation of Cigarettes
In a 1964 public report, the Surgeon General found that smoking ciga-
rettes increased the likelihood of death and disease. 10 Soon after the
Surgeon General's report, Congress began developing a comprehensive
plan to handle cigarette labeling and advertising." As a result, the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was enacted in 1965
(FCLAA or the Act) to both inform the public of any adverse health
effects associated with tobacco use and protect the tobacco manufactur-
ers from suffering any significant business losses. 12 The Act requires
several specific health warnings on cigarette packaging and advertising,
informing consumers that tobacco products may expose them to certain
health risks. 13 The warnings must be conspicuous to the public, and the
10. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING
AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 28-29 (1964) (comparing the mortal-
ity ratios o: cigarette smokers and non-smokers). The likelihood of cigarette smok-
ers dying f-om coronary artery disease is seventy percent higher than those who do
not smoke. See id. at 29. The likelihood of cigarette smokers developing and dying
from chronic bronchitis and emphysema is five-hundred percent higher than those
who do nolt smoke. See id. The likelihood of smokers dying from lung cancer is
one-thousand percent higher than for those who do not smoke. See id.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("[I]t is the policy of the Congress, and the
purpose of this chapter, to establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with
cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health."').
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (stating that it is the policy of Congress to
establish a program whereby "the public may be adequately informed about any
adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each
package.., and in each advertisement" while at the same time "commerce and the
national economy may be (A) protected... and (B) not impeded ...."
13. S3ee id. at §§ 1333 (a)(1)-(2), (b)(1)-(2). All cigarette packaging and
advertising, other than advertising that appears on outdoor billboards, must contain
one of the Ibllowing four labels in conspicuous and legible type:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cacer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Preg-
nancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low
1998]
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manufacturers are required to rotate each warning to ensure that the
same warning is not used on all the packaging. 
4
When the Act was passed in 1965, tobacco manufacturers were re-
quired to warn consumers that smoking was hazardous to their health.
Subsequent amendments to the Act in 1970 substituted the original
warning to indicate that smoking is dangerous to health.' s Amendments
in 1984 required additional warnings on packaging and advertising. In
addition to the mandated warning labels, the Act also preempted the
states and federal agencies from imposing more stringent health warning
requirements.' 6 No other state or federal agency may require cigarette
packaging or advertising to carry any other warning except those re-
quired by the Act.'
7
In 1967, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required
that all television and radio broadcasters provide equal time on their
airwaves to warn the public about the dangers of cigarette smoking.8 In
other words, for every minute of pro-tobacco advertising, there would be
one minute devoted to informing viewers of the dangers of tobacco use.
As an administrative agency, the FCC could implement the restriction
under its authority to control television broadcast. Over 1,000 anti-
tobacco warnings were aired by the major television networks as a result
of the FCC's rule.'
9
Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.
Id. Advertising on outdoor billboards are required to carry one of the four follow-
ing warnings enclosed in a black border:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, And Emphysema.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Health Risks.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Pregnant Women Who
Smoke Risk Fetal Injury, And Premature Birth.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.
Id. §§ 1333 (a)(3), (b)(3).
14. See id. § 1333 (b), (c).
15. See id. § 1333 (citing Pub. L. 91-222, which substituted "'Warning: The
Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your
Health' for 'Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.').
16. Seeid. § 1334.
17. See id
18. See PETER D. JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO
CONTROL LAWS: IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 6 (1997).
19. See id.
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In 1961, however, Congress stripped the FCC of its power to imple-
ment restrictions on tobacco advertising by passing the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (Act of 1969).20 The Act of 1969 banned
all cigarette advertising on television and radio, irrespective of whether
the message encouraged or discouraged tobacco use.21 Ironically, when
the Act of 1969 was enacted, it brought relief to the tobacco industry.
The tobacco industry feared that the public warnings heightened con-
sumer awareness of the perils of smoking, which would lead to greater
regulation of tobacco. 2 Because it is unlawful to advertise on any me-
dium controlled by the FCC, future restrictions that would exacerbate
awarenes!; of the dangers of cigarette smoking were curtailed.
In order for Congress to fulfill its policy of warning the public about
the dangers of smoking while maintaining the national economy, it di-
rected the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to pro-
vide Congress a report each year on the current health consequences of
smoking.' 3 Under this directive, the Secretary was empowered with the
authority to make recommendations on whatever legislation deemed
appropriate to educate the public.
24
After passing the Act of 1969, additional legislation was not imple-
mented until thirteen years later. Congress decided, at that time, that
information about the addictive nature of tobacco products was as im-
portant a; information about the adverse effects tobacco use may have
on one's health.25 Congress directed the Secretary to report every three
years on the addictive nature of tobacco.26 Similar to the legislation re-
quiring a report on health consequences, the Secretary was empowered
with the authority to make recommendations on appropriate
legislation.
27
Congress also mandated that the Secretary establish a program to in-
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (stating it is unlawful "to advertise cigarettes and
little cigan; on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Communications Commission").
21. See id.
22. See JACOBSON & WASSERMAN, supra note 18, at 6.
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1994).
24. See id.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-2(b) (requiring that the report submitted to Con-
gress describes "current research f*ndings made with respect to drug abuse, in-
cluding current findings on ... the addictive property of tobacco").
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-2(b).
27. See id.
1998]
312 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:307
form the public about the dangers of cigarette smoking.28 This legisla-
tion was not enacted until 1984,29 exactly twenty years after the Surgeon
General first reported that smoking cigarettes may have adverse conse-
quences on health. 30 Among some of the provisions meant to effectuate
the program, is the responsibility to conduct research on the connection
between smoking and health, 31 and to disseminate this data and infor-
mation to the public through publications.
32
B. Regulation of Smokeless Tobacco Products
In 1986, Congress passed legislation on smokeless tobacco products
that mirrors many provisions in the legislation affecting tobacco prod-
ucts that are smoked.33 For example, specific warning labels are to be
affixed on packaging and on advertisements for smokeless tobacco
products.34 Furthermore, the Secretary has the responsibility of imple-
menting a program to inform the public about the dangers of using
smokeless tobacco products.35 Advertising smokeless tobacco products
on television is forbidden in the same way it is forbidden to advertise
cigarette products. 6
C. Recent Legislation of Tobacco Products
One of the last pieces of legislation in Congress' attempt to establish a
comprehensive plan to decrease the rate of death and disease resulting
from smoking was the 1992 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1341.
29. See id.
30. See supra text accompanying note 13.
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(1).
32. See id. § 1341 (a)(4).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 4408 (defining smokeless tobacco as "any finely cut,
ground, powdered, or leaf tobacco that is intended to be placed in the oral cavity").
34. See id. § 4402 (a). The following warnings are to be used:
"WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER;"
"WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH
LOSS;" "WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO
CIGARETTES." Id.
35. Seeid. §4401.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (f) (stating that it is unlawful to advertise smoke-
less tobacco products on any medium of electronic communication regulated by the
FCC); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (stating that it is unlawful to advertise cigarette
products on any medium of electronic communication regulated by the FCC).
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'Agency Reorganization Act.37 This Act provides financial incentives to
states to encourage them to enforce their own restrictions on access to
tobacco p:roducts by minors.38 Each state that chooses to participate must
enact legislation prohibiting any manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of
tobacco products from selling or distributing to individuals under eight-
een. 39 In exchange, the federal government will allocate grants to par-
ticipating states for use in the prevention and treatment of substance
abuse.40 Once such state legislation is passed, future grants are awarded
based on the state's compliance with specific conditions.41 First, each
state must conduct annual, random, unannounced inspections of manu-
facturers, retailers, and distributors to ensure compliance with the state's
statute.42 Second, each state must report its actions in enforcing such
law, as well as the rate of success the state has achieved in reducing the
availabilily of tobacco products to individuals under eighteen years of
age.43 Failure to comply with the provisions of the Act will result in a
ten percent decrease in funding for the first year of noncompliance, and
up to forty percent by the fourth year of noncompliance."
II. GRANTING THE INDUSTRY IMMUNITY AS A MEASURE TO
CONTROL TOBACCO USE
Before presenting an exposition of the measures to control tobacco
use that comprises the focus of this Comment, it is important to note that
the Failed Settlement proposed many measures not discussed in this
Comment. This Comment's focus will be on three issues: (1) the grant
of immunity, (2) restrictions on advertising of tobacco products, and (3)
the grant of jurisdiction to the FDA. Although the other measures not
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994).
38. ?ee id § 300x-26 (aXI) (stating that "the Secretary may make a grant..
only if the State involved has in effect a law providing that it is unlawful for any
manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of tobacco products to sell or distribute ... to
any individual under the age of 18").
39. ,ee id
40. ;ee id The regulation at issue provides that grants will be made under
42 U.S.C. § 300x-21. See id 42 U.S.C. § 300x-21 provides that the Secretary
shall make grants for each State "for the purpose of planning, carrying out, and




44. 3ee id. § 300x-26 (c).
1998]
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discussed are equally deserving of attention, the proposals discussed
hereinafter were chosen as the focus because they were the center of
much controversy and debate during negotiations.
A. Immunity as Envisioned in the Failed Settlement
The grant of immunity, as espoused in the Failed Settlement, was de-
signed to settle the current claims against the tobacco manufacturers and
insulate them from future litigation. Because an immunity provision
would serve as a good incentive to encourage the Industry to settle with
Congress, the Industry pushed for immunity during settlement negotia-
tions. It is, therefore, important to evaluate the provision for such im-
munity as envisioned in the Failed Settlement bill. Should the Industry
and Congress resume negotiations for a renewed settlement, many of the
same terms may resurface.
. The Failed Settlement included the following provisions: (1) the pres-
ent state government suits would settle and similar state actions would
be barred in the future;45 (2) all pending claims for addiction and de-
pendency would terminate and the industry would be immune from fu-
ture claims; 46 (3) all pending class actions would terminate and the in-
dustry would be immune from future class actions; 47 and (4) punitive
damages would be eliminated for past conduct and maximum caps
would be placed on the amount the Industry would be ordered to pay
each year on judgments against it.
48
Although Congress tried to limit federal control over tobacco in the
past,49 plaintiffs have never been barred from seeking restitution for
harm caused by the tobacco companies. Since the 1950s, smokers have
sought restitution from the tobacco industry for smoking-related dis-
eases. 50 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Industry was successful in
defending itself against such suits. Past tobacco litigation suits are clas-
45. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 601(a) (1997).
46. See id. § 601 (b)(2).
47. See id. § 601 (b)(1).
48. See id. § 602.
49. See supra Part I.
50. One of the first cases filed against the industry was Lowe v. R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., filed against a tobacco manufacturer in 1954. See Robert L.
Rabin, A Sociological History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 857 (noting in an accompanying footnote that the case was subsequently
dropped but that it was filed in the Eastern District of Missouri on March 10, 1954
as No. 9673(c)).
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sified into three "waves," 51 and the characteristics that define each wave
help to explain why earlier lawsuits brought against the Industry failed.
B. The First Wave of Litigation Against
Tobacco Manufacturers
The first; wave of tobacco litigation began in the early to mid 1950s.52
Generally, plaintiffs filed suits against the Industry under theories of
negligence 3 and breach of warranty.54 These lawsuits were not success-
5 1. See generally Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of
Litigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV, 63, 71 (1997); Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the 'Tobacco In-
dustry's Smoke Screen, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 114 (1996); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle
D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-
Based Regu'ation, 107 YALE L. J. 1163, 1319 (1998).
52. Se Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 71 (stating that the first wave
of tobacco litigation spanned from 1954 to 1973); see also Gary T. Schwartz, To-
bacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE 1:31 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (stating that
the causal connection between smoking and cancer was first publicized in the early
1950s, and that publicizing the connection led to a wave of lawsuits against tobacco
companies); Christine Hatfield, Note and Comment, The Privilege Doctrines - Are
They Just Another Discovery Tool Utilized By the Tobacco Industry to Conceal
Damaging Information?, 16 PACE L. REV. 525, 561 (1996) (stating that the first
wave of litigation began in the 1950s to early 1960s).
53. The definition of negligence is "the failure to use such care as a rea-
sonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the
doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under
similar circumstances. .. ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
The elements necessary to prove a cause of action under a negligence theory are as
follows: (1) the existence of a duty or an obligation requiring a person to conform
to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of the duty to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; (3) a reasonably close causal connection between the breach
of duty and the harm caused; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the
breach of duty. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
54. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 71 (stating that during the first
wave of suits "cases were filed principally under theories of... breach of express
and implied warranty, and negligence"). Meade, supra note 51, at 114 (stating that
in the first wave of litigation recovery was sought under breach of implied warranty
and breach of express warranty). Implied warranty has been defined as "[a]n as-
surance or guaranty, either express in the form of a statement by a seller of goods,
or implied by law, having reference to and ensuring the character, quality, or fitness
of purpose of the goods." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1586 (6th ed. 1990).
19981
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ful. One reason for this failure was that medical knowledge in the 1950s,
and early 1960s, did not establish a link between tobacco use and health
risks. 55 Hence, plaintiffs were unable to prove that smoking was the
proximate cause of the illnesses suffered.56
In Ross v. Philip Morris,57 the plaintiff brought an action against a
tobacco manufacturer for breach of implied warranty after developing
throat cancer.58 The plaintiff argued that Philip Morris owed its consum-
ers a duty to provide cigarettes that did not contain substances that were
harmful or dangerous to their health.59 The plaintiff asserted that if the
tobacco product contain harmful or carcinogenic substances that directly
caused his cancer, Philip Morris should be held liable, irrespective of
whether Philip Morris knew of the danger of the substance.60 Philip
Morris contended that a manufacturer could be held liable under an im-
plied warranty only for harmful defects that could be detected with rea-
sonable foresight. 61 The court held there was no breach of an implied
warranty. 62 The plaintiff presented no evidence that suggested that Philip
55. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 71 (stating that plaintiffs were
"hampered by the paucity of medical studies"); see also Meade, supra note 51, at
119; see also Hatfield, supra note 52, at 561-62.
56. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 71; see also Meade, supra note
51, at 119 (noting that the addictive nature of tobacco products was not fully rec-
ognized at the time and this led to the difficulties in linking smoking with injury).
57. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
58. See id. at 5. The plaintiff also brought action at the district court level
for negligence, but on appeal to the Eighth Circuit the plaintiff sought no review of
his negligence claim. See id.
59. See id. at 5-6. The plaintiff began smoking when he was twenty-eight or
twenty-nine years old. See id. at 5. Several years later, he was smoking up to two
packages of cigarettes a day. See id His consumption increased to smoking be-
tween three and four packages daily. See id. When he was fifty-three years old he
was informed that he had throat cancer, and a subsequent operation left the plaintiff
breathing through an opening in his neck and speaking with the aid of an electronic
device. See id.
60. Seeid at6.
61. See id. at 7. Philip Morris also argued that, under Missouri law, a to-
bacco manufacturer does not implicitly warrant its tobacco product, therefore, the
issue should not be a jury consideration. See id Furthermore, Philip Morris ar-
gued that the evidence admitted was insufficient to establish that smoking caused
the plaintiff's cancer. See id.
62. See Ross, 328 F.2d at 12 (holding that the trial court correctly instructed
the jury on the implied warranty issue).
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Morris was aware that its product contained a cancer-causing agent.
6 3
Furthermo:re, the cigarettes that Philip Morris manufactured were not
adulterated or defective.64 Rather, they were reasonably fit for intended
use.65 As a result, Philip Morris could not be charged. with having
knowledge that harmful or dangerous substances were contained in its
product, therefore, no liability was imposed.66
Likewise, in Lartigue v. KJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,67 the plaintiff
brought an action against a cigarette manufacturer for negligence in
failing to warn the public that the use of its product could cause
cancer.68 The jury delivered a verdict in favor of the defendants. 69 The
plaintiff appealed the decision because he believed the instruction given
to the jury on negligence was in error. 70 The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the charge correctly instructed that in order to impose li-
ability for negligence, Mr. Lartigue must prove that the defendant knew,
or should have known, that its product could cause cancer before his
illness started.71 The instruction further charged that, under the facts of
this case, such knowledge could only be imputed to R.J. Reynolds if
medical science concluded and publicized information linking cancer
and smoking.72 Because the medical community had no such knowledge
63. S.e id at 10 (stating that "plaintiff's position is that... even though
there may have been no immediate harm from smoking a package of cigarettes,...
and'even though no developed human skill or foresight could afford knowledge of
the cancer-smoking relationship, defendant should be held absolutely liable .... ).
64. S.e id at 9. The plaintiff failed to show that Philip Morris' cigarettes, in
particular, contained a foreign or deleterious substance that caused cancer. See id
The plaintiff did not contend that the Philip Morris cigarettes did not conform to
industry standards. See id.
65. Se id. at 9-10.
66. S.e id at 12-13 (stating that a cigarette "manufacturer ... is held as an
absolute insurer against knowable dangers . ..
67. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
68. S.e id at 40. Action was also brought under an implied warranty the-
ory. See id. at 22. The plaintiff argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury was
misleading on the implied warranty theory because they were so interfused with
negligence principles. See id. at 23. The Fifth Circuit held that the instruction on
implied warranty was correct; the trial judge differentiated between the implied
warranty claim and the negligence claim. See id at 24.
69. Se id, at 22.
70. Soe id at 40.
71. Se id.at 39-40.
72.' S.e Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 40. ("The defendants cannot be held guilty of
negligence on the basis of medical opinion, surveys, or other similar materials not
1998]
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at that time, the plaintiff could not establish the causal connection es-
sential to any negligence claim. 3
Another reason the tobacco companies were successful in refuting
claims during this first wave of litigation was because they had the fi-
nancial resources to employ effective defense strategies and limit the
number of lawsuits filed against them.7 4 Collectively, each tobacco
company vowed not to settle any dispute because each company main-
tained that they were not responsible for any injury sustained as the re-
sult of using their products.7 5 That decision meant they would defend
themselves against every claim through a trial and any appeal, irrespec-
tive of costs. 76 The cigarette companies were well aware that one settle-
ment would lead to the filing of thousands of similar claims.7 To protect
itself from damaging lawsuits, the Industry retained high paid defense
attorneys from prestigious law firms, mailed plaintiffs extensive inter-
rogatories, and took mass depositions. 8 Costly' expert witnesses also
became an important part of trial.79 Obtaining expert testimony to estab-
lish the causal link between smoking and adverse health consequences
imposed a significant burden on the plaintiffs.80 In sum, the litigation
strategies employed by the Industry illustrated how the cigarette compa-
nies were formidable figures that were too powerful and too wealthy for
plaintiffs to battle.
announced until after that time.").
73. See id.
74. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 71; Hatfield, supra note 52, at
562.
75. See Rabin, supra note 50, at 857.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 858-59; Hatfield, supra note 52, at 562.
79. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds, 317 F.2d 19, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1963)
(pointing out that the record comprised twenty volumes; chemical studies were
admitted, as well as "epidemiological studies, reports of animal experiments,
pathological evidence, reports of clinical observations, and the testimony of re-
nowned doctors").
80. See Rabin, supra note 50, at 858 (noting that the expense was due, in
part, to the travel time, witness fee, and time-related costs in keeping them avail-
able for testimony).
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C. The Second Wave of Litigation Suits Against
Tobacco Manufacturers
The second wave of litigation began in 1983.81 Among some of the
claims plaintiffs asserted were product liability,82 negligence,8 3 strict
liability, 4 and failure to warn.85 Many factors prompted the second wave
that were rnot present twenty years earlier during the first wave of litiga-
tion. One: such factor involved society's perception of cigarette
smoking.8" The unknown risks associated with smoking probably in-
creased the social acceptability of smoking during the first wave. This,
in turn, ino-reased the difficulties of litigating successful claims.8 7 During
the second wave of lawsuits, the idea of smoking a cigarette was not as
socially acceptable as it had been in the past.88 In addition, large law
firms, experienced in sophisticated tort litigation, were trying cases
against the, tobacco industry, as opposed to sole practitioners litigating
in the firs: wave of suits.8 9 Now, large parties were joining collectively,
81. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 64.
82. Froduct liability is the "legal liability imposed on manufacturers and
sellers to compensate buyers, users, and even bystanders, for damages or injuries
suffered because of defects in goods suffered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209
(6th ed. 1990). A claim of products liability is distinguished from strict liability in
that strict liability is but one possible theory of recovery within a products liability
claim. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, § 95, at 678. The theories of recovery
under modem products liability law are: (1) strict liability for breach of express or
implied warranty, (2) negligence for breach of express or implied warranty in that
the product was not designed and manufactured in a workmanlike manner, (3) neg-
ligence claim for physical harm, and (4) strict liability for physical harm. See id
83. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1032.
84. Strict liability has been defined, in terms of product liability cases, as the
imposition of liability without fault. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th
ed. 1990). It is applied in cases where the "seller is liable for any and all defective
or hazardous products which unduly threaten a consumer's personal safety." Id
85. Liability for the failure to warn may be imposed upon a manufacturer or
seller for faiiling to warn or warning inadequately about any risks or hazards inher-
ent in the product's design in relation to the product's intended use and any rea-
sonably foreseeable uses of a product. See id. at 685.
86. See Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT &
INS. L. J. 90, 92 (1986).
87. See id.
88. See id. (describing the negative attitude towards cigarette smoking as
"border[ing] on asocial behavior").
89. See id.
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pooling their money, personnel, and technical expertise.
90
One of the more important factors, however, separating the first wave
of litigation from the second was the availability of medical studies to
establish the causal connection between smoking and disease. 91 Because
the medical risks associated with smoking were more pronounced than
in previous years, it would have seemed likely that plaintiffs would have
been more successful at imputing liability to the tobacco industry. Yet,
the plaintiffs did not succeed.92 In fact, the more acute medical knowl-
edge about the dangers of smoking served as a detriment to the plaintiffs
in arguing their claims. The more people knew about the risks associated
with tobacco use, the easier the Industry could argue that smoking was a
deliberate, conscientious decision. 93 In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co.,94 for example, the plaintiff argued that R.J. Reynolds failed
to warn him that he could be at risk for vascular disease.95 Although the
FCLAA mandates that specific warnings be printed on cigarette pack-
ages, 96 none of the warnings specifically address the potential for devel-
oping vascular disease. 97 Despite the fact that the plaintiff introduced
evidence linking smoking to vascular disease,98 his failure to warn claim
was dismissed.99 The Sixth Circuit held that the claim was preempted by
the FCLAA 00 because the Act specifies that no other statement relating
90. See id (describing that the extent of the cooperation by attorneys for the
plaintiffs reached national proportions and that the larger firms had the "financial,
technical, and manpower resources necessary to go the distance").
91. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5 1, at 71; see also Meade, supra note
51, at 122.
92. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 71; see also Meade, supra note
51, at 122.
93. See Rabin, supra note 50, at 870 (stating that the most prominent theme
threaded through the spectrum of second wave cases was the argument that, despite
the warnings, people who smoked did so by deliberate, conscious choice).
94. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
95. See id. at 232. The plaintiff, Mr. Roysdon, was an addicted smoker who
had severe peripheral atherosclerotic vascular disease. See id. His left leg had to
be amputated because his disease prevented his foot from properly healing from a
surgical procedure he underwent. See id
96. See discussion supra Part I.
97. See Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 233 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
98. See id. at 232.
99. See id.
100. See id at 235.
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to smoking and health shall be required other than those mandated.10' If
a jury were to find that the tobacco manufacturer, by complying with the
terms of the FCLAA, failed to warn its consumers of inherent product
risks, then the congressional intent behind the FCLAA would be threat-
ened." 2
In Roysdon, the Sixth Circuit also addressed a product liability
claim.10 3 The court applied Tennessee law, which stated that a manu-
facturer would be held liable if a product was in a "defective condition"
or was "unreasonably dangerous."'' 4 The court concluded that the ciga-
rette products met neither of these definitions0 5 and affirmed the di-
rected verdict in favor of the defendants.10 6 Consumers were well aware
of the risks associated with smoking.'07 There was no proof that the
cigarettes were improperly manufactured or that they presented greater
risks than those known to be associated with smokingOB Moreover, the
risks associated with smoking were common knowledge, and there was
extensive information regarding the dangers. 0 9
In GilboY v. American Tobacco Co.," 0 the plaintiff, a lifetime smoker
diagnosed with cancer, brought a cause of action under theories of prod-
uct liability and strict liability."' The court affirmed summary judgment
101. See id. at 233 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982)).
102. See Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234-35 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
The purpose of Congress, in enacting FCLAA, was to inform the public about the
dangers of cigarette smoking as well as protect the national economy. See id at
234 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). Congress would not have intended for its
balance of nations interests to be superceded by the views of a single jury in a sin-
gle state. See id. at 234 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626
(1st Cir. 1987)).
103. See id. at 236.
104. See id at 235-36.
105. Under Tennessee law, a "defective condition" is defined as "'a condi-
tion of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and
consumption." Id. at 236 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(2)). Under Ten-
nessee law, an "unreasonably dangerous" product is one that "is 'dangerous to an
extent beyond that which could be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its char-
acteristics."' Id (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(8)).




110. 572 So. 2d 289 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
111. See id. at 289-90.
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in favor of the defendants and denied recovery on the plaintiffs
claims." 2 The plaintiff asserted in the strict liability claim that smoking
is an ultra-hazardous activity." 3 The court rejected this claim because
smoking cigarettes involves an individual consumer choice to do so.
Unlike other ultra-hazardous activities, smoking cigarettes does not in-
volve a risk dangerous enough that the tobacco manufacturer would as-
sume the consequences of injury to others.14
In rejecting the plaintiffs product liability claim, the court recognized
that product liability involves compensating individuals for injuries
sustained as the result of defects in a manufacturer's product. 15 The
court pointed out that use of a tobacco manufacturer's product does not
cause harm that consumers could not have anticipated." 6 It was wide-
spread knowledge that cigarettes are dangerous to one's health.'"
Moreover, there are sufficient warning labels on the packaging that raise
awareness of the risks. 1 8 By smoking, therefore, the plaintiff made a
conscious decision and must bear the consequences of such deliberated
action.1 9
D. The Promise the Third Wave of Litigation
Has for Plaintiffs
1. State-Initiated Medicaid Suits: The Third Wave of Litigation
The suits filed by state attorneys general to recover Medicaid ex-
112. See id. at 290 (noting that the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment asserted that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Louisiana's Product




115. See Gilboy, 572 So. 2d at 290.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 290-91.
119. See id. at 291. The court used strong language in addressing the rea-
sons why the plaintiff failed to state a claim. See id. The court said, "The law
would protect [the plaintiff] from a product that had a hidden defect. The law
would protect [the plaintiff] from a product that lacked an adequate warning. The
law would even protect [the plaintiff] from harm arising from the misuse of a de-
fective product. However, the law will not protect [the plaintiff] from himself." Id
at 291-92.
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penses, that prompted the negotiations to the Failed Settlement, are ex-
amples of' the types of cases in the third wave of litigation. 120 Most com-
plaints by the states allege, inter alia, that the Industry is guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation12 1 and breach of warranty.122 Common to
many of the complaints, however, are the theories of unjust
enrichment' 2 and conspiracy.
124
In order for a state to prove that the tobacco companies were unjustly
enriched, it must be established that the tobacco companies received
enormous profits through the sale of their products to addicted
smokers.I ' When addicted consumers developed serious medical prob-
lems, the state paid for their treatment through its Medicaid program.
126
Consequently, the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched by avoid-
ing health care costs incurred as a result of the use of their products.
To show that the tobacco manufacturers are liable for conspiracy, it
may be necessary to show that the manufacturers, with intent and unlaw-
ful purpose, entered in a concert of action to misrepresent the degree of
120. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 73; see also Meade, supra
note 51, at 124.
121. Fraudulent misrepresentation is defined as a false statement as to a
material fact that is made with the intent that the other party rely on it and the other
party does, indeed, rely and does so to their detriment. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 662 (6th ed. 1990).
122. Breach of warranty is defined as a breach in the assurance or guaranty
made by the producer of a good that the good sold has certain qualities, fitness, or
characters. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1586 (6th ed. 1990). Warranties on
goods sold may be either express or implied. See id at 1586-87. An express war-
ranty is a promise that is ancillary to an underlying sales contract in which the
seller assures the qualities, description, or performance of the good. See id. at
1587. An implied warranty is a promise that arises through operation of law which
assures that the good sold is merchantable and fit for purpose. See id.
123. The theory behind the principle of unjust enrichment is that one per-
son should not be able to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of others. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (6th ed. 1990). If a party has been found to be
unjustly enriched at the expense of another, restitution should be made for benefits
received. See id.
124. Conspiracy, in the context of a civil lawsuit, has been defined as "a
concert or combination to defraud or cause other injury to person ... , which re-
sults in darnage to the person... of plaintiff." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 310
(6th ed. 1990).
125. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 81.
126. See id.
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harm tobacco use could cause.1 27 It may be necessary to establish that
the Industry suppressed research and prevented the dissemination of
information on the harmful effects of tobacco use.
128
2. The Promise the Third Wave Holds for Imputing Liability on the
Industry
Notwithstanding the difficulty in litigating the first and second
waves,129 the third wave of litigation appears to be the most promising
for plaintiffs. Such success will be thwarted, however, if an immunity
provision similar to that previously negotiated in the Failed Settlement
is implemented into a program to reduce tobacco use. If there is to be
any progress in controlling tobacco use in this country, it is imperative
that the Industry receive no immunity from liability.
Any victory in the current wave of litigation will have devastating
financial effects on the Industry. 130 Because of the difficulty the Industry
will have in defending itself against state Medicaid reimbursement suits,
most of the economic burden for treating smoking-related illnesses will
be diverted to the tobacco companies.13 1 At present, the Industry faces
mounting litigation. 132 Most states filed claims against the Industry, and
other pending lawsuits have been initiated by members of the private
sector.
133
Because of the intense litigation facing the tobacco companies, they
would want an immunity provision should Congress and the Industry
resume settlement negotiations. In fact, it is possible the Industry is
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See supra Parts I.B., II.C.
130. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 70; see also Lynn M. Lo-
Pucki, Some Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1998, at A 15 (stating that the
amount of damages sought in the current lawsuits against the industry exceeds the
entire value of the tobacco companies). See, e.g., The Big Numbers of 1997 Ver-
dicts, 20 NAT'L L. J. Feb. 23, 1998, at C15 (reporting that the tobacco industry
settled its lawsuit with the state of Florida for $11.3 billion and settled with Missis-
sippi for $3.6 billion).
131. See LoPucki, supra note 130, at A15.
132. See Robert L. Conason & Howard S. Hershenhom, Pending National
Tobacco Settlement: A Smoke Screen? N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at S12.
133. See id. (detailing the other lawsuits that were filed, including pending
claims from unions to recover on behalf of union members, public actions from
cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco, and private claims from individuals).
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aware of :he promise the third wave of litigation has for state plaintiffs
and that this realization was what prompted the initial settlement discus-
sions.
134
3. The Secret to the Success of Third Wave Litigation Suits
One reason for the projected success of the third wave is the release of
confidential documents to the public showing that the tobacco manu-
facturers knew their products were addictive and hid their knowledge
from consumers.13s This evidence may effectively establish that the In-
dustry is liable, at a minimum, of conspiring to lure young adults to use
and, ultimately, addict them to tobacco products. It may also establish
that tobacco manufacturers intentionally misrepresented to the public the
effects using their products would have on health.
Some of the documents show that tobacco manufacturers specifically
targeted teenagers in order to secure the demand for their products in the
future. 136 ]For example, documents from R.J. Reynolds strongly support
the contention that the "Joe Camel" image was designed to appeal to
children.' 7 The documents unequivocally reveal that R.J. Reynolds ex-
ecutives knew that the best way to continue the prosperity of their com-
134. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 51, at 1320; see also Conason &
Hershenhorn, supra note 132, at S12.
135. See, e.g., Memos Highlight Importance of 'Younger Adult Smokers'
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at A18; Internal R.J. Reynolds Documents Show That
Marketing Proposals Targeted Children WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al; John
Schwartz, Philip Morris Memos Detail Teen Habits, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1998,
at AI5.
136. One memo originating from a Board of Directors meeting at R.J.
Reynolds dated Sept. 30, 1974, outlined the company's plans for future marketing
strategies. Memos Highlight Importance of 'Younger Adult Smokers, supra note
135, at A18. "'We will speak to... key opportunity areas to accomplish this [goal
of reestablihing R.J. Reynold's share of marketing growth in the domestic ciga-
rette industiy]. They are: (1) Increase our young adult franchise."' Id
137. See Internal RJ. Reynolds Documents Show That Marketing Propos-
als Targeted Children, supra note 135, at A18 (quoting directly from memos re-
leased in Jamuary 1998 from R.J. Reynolds archives). Although none of the re-
leased documents explicitly say that Joe Camel was meant to attract children, the
campaign was based on an advertising stunt in France. See id The advertising
campaign in France was a huge success among children/teenagers. See id Addi-
tionally, an R.J. Reynolds memo from an official at the company said "the French
campaign was 'about as young as you can get, and aims right at the young adult
smoker Camel needs to attract."' Id. (quoting from a 1974 R.J. Reynolds memo).
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pany was to target the youth of America.1
38
Documents were also released from other tobacco companies detailing
their strategies to target young smokers. One internal memo from Philip
Morris, for example, details the company's surge to attract consumers as
young as twelve years old in efforts of securing the demand for its prod-
uct in the future. 139 The documents show that Philip Morris was con-
cerned that the rate of teenage smoking in the mid-1970s declined. 4"
They knew they had the highest share of youth smokers than any other
manufacturer and such a decline would hurt the future success of their
business.
14'
Documents from Brown & Williamson were also released to the pub-
lic detailing its attempt to target youth smokers. 142 One memo was par-
ticularly egregious in that it suggested adding an ingredient to sweeten
the taste of its tobacco products because teenagers enjoy sweet tasting
products. 43 Another memo from their vestiges recommended that the
company should not avoid changing the understanding that smoking is
dangerous.' 44 Instead, focus should be on making smoking out to be in
an illicit category of vices, like beer and sex, in order to encourage its
138. "Realistically, if our Company is to survive and prosper, over the long
term we must get our share of the youth market.... This will require new brands
tailored to the youth market; . . ."' Id. (quoting from a Feb. 2, 1973, memo written
by R.J. Reynolds senior researcher Claude Teague). "'[R.J. Reynolds] should not in
any way influence non-smokers' to start smoking; rather we should simply recog-
nize that many or most of.the '21 and under' group will inevitably become smok-
ers, and offer them an opportunity to use our brands."' Id. (quoting from a Feb. 2,
1973, memo written by R.J. Reynolds senior researcher Claude Teague). "'[The
young adult market in the 14-24 age group] represent tomorrow's cigarette busi-
ness. As this 14-24 age group matures, they will account for a key share of the
total cigarette volume - for at least the next 25 years ... ."' Id. (quoting from a
presentation to R.J. Reynolds board of directors meeting, dated Sept. 30, 1974).
139. See Schwartz, supra note 135, at A15 (quoting from an internal
document from Philip Morris stating that "'today's teenager is tomorrow's poten-
tial regular customer').
140. See id. (citing from a March 1981 memo to the vice president of
Philip Morris).
141. See id. (describing the decline in youth smokers from 1976-77 as
"troubling" in the memo to vice president of Philip Morris).
142. See id. at A3.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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145
4. Why Giving the Tobacco Industry Immunity Would Be Detrimental
to the Fight Against Tobacco
Granting immunity to the Industry virtually obliterates any incentive
to litigate: against the tobacco industry. 46 Barring plaintiffs from insti-
tuting class action suits in the future as well as state-initiated Medicaid
reimbursement suits would leave the sole plaintiff to litigate against the
entire industry. The history of the first wave of litigation demonstrated
that fighting the tobacco industry alone is a losing battle. 47 Without
strong claimants who can withstand intense litigation, the tobacco in-
dustry would be empowered with the ammunition necessary to remain a
formidable and powerful defendant.
The provision in the Failed Settlement that eliminates punitive dam-
ages for past conduct would also deter a sole plaintiff from bringing a
suit against the Industry. 48 In fact, this provision would decrease the
incentive to sue the tobacco industry to a greater extent than the elimi-
nation of future class actions and State Medicaid suits.149 Once again,
history has shown that the tobacco industry is too wealthy to fight with-
out the incentive of receiving a large recovery through punitive dam-
ages.150 Long depositions are costly, interrogatories are time-consuming,
and expert witnesses are often difficult to find. With the financial incen-
tive reduced, a plaintiff may not be financially capable of litigating a
claim they believe would be successful.
If a settlement passes with a similar immunity provision in the future,
the Industry will have been successful at crafting pro-tobacco laws un-
der the guise of tobacco control measures. It will be immune from hav-
ing to pay millions of dollars to each individual litigant who may have a
viable claim against it. It will also be able to keep out the confidential
document; that pose a serious threat to its continued prosperity. 51 If the
incentive to sue is thwarted by a settlement that includes an immunity
provision, so will the incentive to use the documents against the Indus-
145. See Schwartz, supra note 135, at A3.
146. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 51, at 1320.
147. See supra Part II.B.
148. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 51, at 1320.
149. See id.
150. See supra Part II.B. (detailing how the Industry used trial tactics that
decreased the financial incentives for plaintiffs to pursue suits against it).
151. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 51, at 1320.
1998]
328 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:307
try. 52 The strongest, most direct evidence against the Industry is its own
admission of culpable and deceptive conduct. Although the documents
were released to the public, they are useless if they cannot be used
against the Industry in litigation.
III. IMPLEMENTING ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS ON THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY AS A MEASURE TO CONTROL TOBACCO
USE
A. Restrictions Proposed Under the Failed Settlement
Tobacco products are heavily advertised and widely promoted prod-
ucts in the United States.153 The restrictions on advertising in the Failed
Settlement constituted some of the most radical restrictions of all the
provisions. The scope of the restrictions is unprecedented when com-
pared to previous advertising bans. 154 Although television and radio
were eliminated as advertising forums for tobacco products early in the
history of federal tobacco control laws, 155 that restriction occurred al-
most thirty years ago. Similar restrictive measures to control advertising
have not been taken since then.' 56 There is a strong correlation between
advertising and increased demand for tobacco products. If any of the
restrictions proposed in the Failed Settlement were implemented in the
future, they could reduce tobacco use significantly. For this reason, the
ad restrictions in the Failed Settlement merit analysis.
Although not an exhaustive list, the Failed Settlement included the
following: (1) a ban on all outdoor advertising as well as indoor adver-
tising that is directed outside, (2) a ban on the use of human images and
cartoon characters in all advertising and packaging, (3) a ban on adver-
tising on the Internet, (4) a requirement that advertising exposed to chil-
dren be on a black-and-white background, with a text-only format, ex-
cept in publications where the readership of individuals eighteen years
of age or younger is, at most fifteen percent, but fewer than two million
young readers, (5) a prohibition on the sale or distribution of promo-
152. See id.
153. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44475 (1996) (citing Federal Trade Commis-
sion figures of overall expenditures for 1993 which indicated that tobacco indus-
tries spent over $6.1 billion to promote its products).
154. See supra Part L.A.
155. See supra Part I.
156. See id
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tional, non-tobacco related items, such as tee-shirts and hats, (6) a pro-
hibition on any direct or indirect payments in efforts of glamorizing the
image of tobacco use in the media that appeal to children, including any
live music: performances, (7) a prohibition on allowing manufacturers to
sponsor aniy musical, athletic, artistic or social event in which the brand
name, logo or other indicia of product identification is used, and (8) a
requirement that product descriptors, like "light" or "low tar," be ac-
companied by disclaimer that the brand has not been shown to be less
hazardous than other brands. 157
B. Restrictions on Advertising Implicate First Amendment
Commercial Speech Concerns
If Congress mandated advertising restrictions, First Amendment
commercial speech concerns must be considered. Commercial speech is
defined a; expression that relates to the economic interests of its
speaker,158 including advertisements for products or services. 159 Because
tobacco advertisements propose a commercial transaction, they are
within the protection of the First Amendment. Historically, the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment did not provide protections for
commercial speech. 160 Commercial advertising did not implicate the
constitutional protection of the First Amendment. 16 1 As a result, courts
gave state and federal legislatures a significant amount of deference in
157. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. §§ 101-105 (1997).
158. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (stating that commercial speech is "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience").
159. Although the Supreme Court was not explicit in its definition of
commercial speech, the cases involving First Amendment Commercial Speech
considerations have involved product advertising. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (deciding whether a Rhode Island law banning
the advertising of retail liquor prices is constitutional).
160. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (stating that the
Constitution "imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commer-
cial advertising"); see also Bread v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951) (up-
holding a conviction for violation of an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solici-
tation of magazine subscriptions); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.27, at 1011-12 (West Publishing, 4th ed. 1991) (not-
ing that in the years after the Chrestensen decision, later cases relied on the Su-
preme Court's pronouncement to exclude commercial speech from any protection
of the First Amendment).
161. See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
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restricting commercial speech to protect the public.
62
It was not until the Court decided Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council163 that commercial speech was brought
within the parameters of the First Amendment. At issue in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy was a statute prohibiting pharmacists from adver-
tising prices for prescription drugs in an effort to maintain high stan-
dards of professional conduct for its licensed pharmacists.64 Even
though the speech only proposed a commercial idea, the Court indicated
that such speech had some value in the marketplace of ideas. 165 The
public had a First Amendment interest in the free flow of truthful infor-
mation about lawful activity. 166 Furthermore, the public's interest out-
weighed paternalistic interests the state had in maintaining high profes-
sional standards for pharmacists. 167 The public had an interest in making
intelligent and well-informed economic decisions. Advertising is the
dissemination of information, 68 therefore, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable in achieving that end.
169
C. The Constitutional Test for Commercial Speech Concerns
1. Central Hudson's Four-Prong Test
The Supreme Court developed a four-part test to analyze whether re-
strictions on commercial speech violated the First Amendment in Cen-
162. See id.
163. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
164. See id. at 749-50.
165. See id. at 764.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 766-67.
168. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 ("Advertising, how-
ever tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination
of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price."); see also 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S 484, 496-97
(1996) (quoting Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765) (reemphasizing the
assertion that commercial speech is the dissemination of information despite the
potential for excess and tastelessness).
169. The Court reasoned that the market-place is a forum in which ideas
and information flourish. Virginia Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. The speaker
and the audience have the right to assess the value of the information expressed and
not the government. See id.
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tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.170 A
regulation promulgated by the State Public Service Commission banned
all public utility advertising that promoted the consumption of electric-
ity.17 1 The Court held that the regulation was invalid because the state
failed to show that a more limited speech regulation would not have
served its interest. 72 Government regulations on commercial speech
must meet the following four-part analysis to be valid: (1) the expres-
sion must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading; (2) the
asserted governmental interest must be substantial; (3) the restriction
must directly advance the interest; and (4) the regulation must not be
more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest173
It is this idea, that commercial speech protects the interests of the ad-
vertiser-speaker, as well as the audience-listener, that will subject the
advertising restrictions on tobacco to First Amendment scrutiny. The
tobacco industry may waive its right to argue any First Amendment
claim by agreeing to the terms of a settlement. 74 Yet, that is not to say
that by agreeing to advertising restrictions, all First Amendment scrutiny
disappears. The consuming public will have standing to sue, irrespective
of whether the restrictions are adopted through negotiations similar to
the Failed Settlement or legislated without the consent of the tobacco
industry. [n fact, the plaintiffs in Virginia Board of Pharmacy were not
licensed pharmacists, but they were consumers of prescription drugs
who argued they had a right to be informed of the prices of the drugs
they may need.1
5
The analysis developed in Central Hudson serves as the current con-
stitutional standard in determining whether a restriction on advertising
tobacco products is lawful under the First Amendment. 76 Subsequent
170. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
171. See id at 558.
172. See id. at 570-71 ("[ln the absence of a showing that more limited
speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppres-
sion of Central Hudson's advertising.").
173. See id. at 566.
174. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (citing
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)).
175. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 754 (1976).
176. Although the four-part test developed in Central Hudson has been
narrowed, it still serves as the proper test to be used in an analysis of commercial
speech resirictions. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24
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Supreme Court decisions, however, have refined the Central Hudson
test and will be discussed below.
a. The First Prong Under Central Hudson
As articulated in the four-part test, advertising must concern lawful
activity and must not mislead consumers to be considered protected
speech. 177 The Court arrived at this conclusion by analyzing the nature
of the speech that is at issue and the interest the government will serve
by regulating it.178 For example, when advertising is misleading, the
opportunity for consumers to make informed, intelligent decisions di-
minishes. The government, as the protector of the general welfare, must
prevent the dissemination of information that is unlawful and
deceitful. 179 Such advertising may be prohibited entirely, and the speak-
ers of the unlawful or deceitful advertising are not protected by the First
Amendment whatsoever.
80
Tobacco advertising that reaches the adult population concerns lawful
activity. However, it is unlawful in every state to sell tobacco products
to children under the age of eighteen.' 8' Proponents of the advertising
restrictions may argue that, to the extent the restrictions relate to the sale
of the products to children, they are not speech protected by the First
Amendment. This argument may attempt to provide a justification, al-
beit a weak one, for at least one of the bans that was negotiated in the
Failed Settlement. It was suggested that the "Joe Camel" image was an
advertising campaign designed to attract children to using tobacco prod-
ucts. 18 2 If the documents released from the archives of the tobacco
manufacturers show that cartoon images were used in their advertising
ploys to attract children, then a ban on the use of cartoon images will not
have to go through First Amendment analysis. Such a ban will be con-
stitutional because it attacks an unlawful activity.
Arguing that a First Amendment analysis is unnecessary because the
speech concerns unlawful activity, however, will not provide the strong-
(1995).
177. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
178. See id. at 563.
179. See Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising:
A First Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 99, 110 (1988).
180. See id.; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
181. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44470-71.
182. See supra Part 1I.D.3.
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est suppoit for upholding the advertising restrictions. After all, only one
restriction promulgated from the Failed Settlement would have been
constitutionally valid without having to go through a full Central Hud-
son analy;is. The remaining restrictions would have been analyzed un-
der the remaining prongs to determine their constitutionality. Therefore,
the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson test will be analyzed
to evaluate whether the other proposed advertising restrictions in the
Failed Settlement violate the First Amendment. This analysis begins
with the second prong of the test which assumes that the speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment and demands that the asserted govern-
mental interest be substantial.
183
b. The Second Prong Under Central Hudson
Proponents of the restrictions will argue that protecting children from
the dangers of smoking is a substantial interest. Generally, issues sur-
rounding the welfare of children receive special consideration by the
Supreme Court.1)4 The Court has recognized that the legislature should
safeguard children from abuse in an effort to ensure that they grow to be
well-developed and independent citizens.t85 In fact, the Court decided
that children may have their freedom of choice limited due to their lack
of experience and judgement. 18 6 Proponents of advertising restrictions
should argue that children should be safeguarded from the dangers of
tobacco use in asserting their governmental interest. Advertising restric-
tions are necessary, therefore, because they are designed to dissuade
children from making decisions that may be detrimental to their well-
being.
Not onlly would the proponents have the support of the Supreme
Court's decisions in protecting children, but they also would have sub-
stantive evidence showing a correlation between youth smoking and
subsequent addiction. One such piece of evidence includes the FDA's
183. See Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 564.
184. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) ("Accordingly, we
[The Supreme Court] have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical
and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensi-
tive area of constitutionally protected rights.").
185. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968) (citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
186. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
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conclusion that nicotine is a pediatric disease. 87 The Agency's conclu-
sion is supported by evidence that shows that most people who suffer
from tobacco-related illnesses began using tobacco before reaching the
age of eighteen. 88 Children are beginning to use tobacco products at
earlier ages than had once been reported.' 89 In fact, the FDA predicts
that if the rate of young users continues to increase, there will be little
chance for society to curb tobacco-related illnesses in the future.190 Be-
cause it is unlikely that individuals who did not begin smoking as ado-
lescents will ever develop smoking habits in their adult lives, the inci-
dences of tobacco-related illness will decrease if the rate of youth smok-
ers declines.' 91
c. The Third Prong Under Central Hudson
The third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test require that the
governmental interest be directly advanced by reasonable means that are
narrowly tailored. 92 These prongs are concerned with the nexus between
the legislature's stated ends and the means chosen to realize those ends.
To show that the restrictions would directly advance the government's
substantial interests, thereby satisfying the third prong of the test in
Central Hudson, Congress must provide evidence of the correlation
between marketing techniques and the increase of tobacco use among
children. A regulation that affects commercial speech will not be sus-
tained if it does not directly support the governmental interest. Specifi-
cally, the regulation must materially affect the interest.1 93 The Supreme
187. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44398-99 (1996).
188. See id. at 44398 (reporting that 88% of adults who have ever smoked
had their first cigarette by the time they were eighteen).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 44399.
191. See id.
192. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
193. In Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), the Court struck down a
state ban against solicitation by certified public accountants for failing the third
prong of Central Hudson. See id. at 767. The Court reasoned that the state bears
the burden of showing that the regulation will advance its interest "to a material
degree." 1d; see Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 479 (1995) (invalidating a federal
law that prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol content on the ground that
the restriction failed materially to advance the asserted state interest in preventing
"strength war" among brewers and protecting the welfare of its citizens).
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Court, however, had given state legislatures great deference in justifying
the use of advertising restrictions.194 In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associ-
ates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,195 a Puerto Rican statute restricted
advertising of casino gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico. 196 The
Court uphld the restriction. 197 When the Court analyzed the third prong
of Central Hudson to determine the legitimacy of the statute, the Court
readily accepted the legislature's finding that exposing the citizens of
Puerto Rico to advertising for the local casinos would increase gam-
bling. 98 In fact, the Court believed a connection could be established by
the mere fact that the appellant-hotel/casino litigated the issue all the
way to the Supreme Court.199 A connection between advertising and
gambling mrust exist, the Court found, because Posadas would not con-
test the restriction unless it believed that not imposing the restriction
would yield to an increase in sales.200 The Court did not suggest that
empirical evidence establishing a connection between advertising and an
increase in gambling was necessary. Nor did the Court look to any other
authority to support the legislature's proposition.
The Posadas decision encouraged courts to defer to a legislature's
finding that the chosen restriction will directly advance a state's inter-
ests. However, in subsequent decisions, the Court has attempted to re-
strict the latitude Posadas afforded state and federal legislatures. In fact,
the Court noted that Posadas erroneously applied the Central Hudson
factors.201 One case where the Court tried to restrict the degree of defer-
ence to the legislature was Edenfield v. Fane.0 2 At issue in Edenfield
was a ban prohibiting certified public accountants from engaging in di-
rect, personal, uninvited solicitation of clients.0 3 The Court held that a
legislature has the burden of justifying its restrictions by more than mere
194. See Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Tobacco Advertisements and Com-
mercial Speech Balancing: A Potential Cancer To Truthful, Nonmisleading Ad-
vertisements of Lawful Products, 82 CORNELL L.R. 432, 444 (1997).
195. .478 U.S. 328 (1986).
196. Yee id at 330.
197. See id. at 348.
198. See id at 341-42.
199. ,8ee id. at 342.
200. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.
201. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,509 (1996).
202. 307 U.S. 761 (1993).
203. See id. at 763-64.
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speculation or conjecture.204 The governmental body must show that the
harms it is attempting to prevent are real and that the restrictions will
alleviate them in a direct and material way.20 5 In striking down the
state's restriction, the Court recognized that there was an absence of any
studies or anecdotal evidence that may support the state's contention
that the restriction directly advances the state's interest.
20 6
There is substantial evidence that links advertising and smoking to
minors. For restrictions to be imposed, it is not necessary to prove con-
clusively that the correlation exists with empirical evidence or that the
restrictions will solve the problem of youth smoking. 20 7 However, in
light of the severity of the advertising restrictions, it may be necessary
to show that they will significantly reduce tobacco consumption. In 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island,0 8 the Court evaluated, inter alia, the effec-
tiveness of a ban on advertising the prices of alcohol to reduce alcohol
consumption. 20 9 A plurality of the Court agreed that the evidence on the
record supported a finding that such a ban will have some impact on
alcohol consumption. 210 However, the state would need to provide evi-
dence that the ban would significantly reduce consumption. 21n The plu-
rality made its determination based, in part, on the stringency of the ad-
vertising restriction. 212 In the context of tobacco advertising, many of the
restrictions in the Failed Settlement included bans and prohibitions that
204. See id. at 770.
205. See id. at 770-71.
206. See id at 771. But see United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418, 427-28 (1993) ("[I]f there is an immediate connection between advertising and
demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that
the policy of decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced."). C.f
Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995) (striking down a section of the Federal
Alcohol Administration Act that prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol
content because the government failed to demonstrate that this restriction would
alleviate the stated harm to a material degree).
207. See Edge Broad Co., 509 U.S. at 434 (1993) (stating that the Gov-
ernment may still advance its interests through regulation even though the problem
is not eradicated entirely).
208. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
209. See id at 505.
210. See id. at 506.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 505 ("The need for the State to make such a showing is
particularly great given the drastic nature of its chosen means - the wholesale sup-
pression of truthful, non-misleading information.").
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would have greatly restricted the way tobacco manufacturers advertise.
As a result of such stringent demands on the Industry, the Court would
expect Congress to show that the restrictions on tobacco advertising will
significantly reduce consumption by minors market-wide should similar
restrictions be imposed on the Industry in the future.
There is research available that shows a connection between adver-
tising and demand for tobacco products by children.213 It has been es-
tablished that cigarette advertising actually encourages young people to
smoke, and that the only effective way to combat this problem, is to in-
stitute bans on advertising from tobacco manufacturers. 214 Despite R.J.
Reynolds' claim that the image of "Joe Camel" was created to lure
adults to switch to its Camel brand of cigarettes, researchers concluded
that "Joe Camel" advertising was more successful at marketing Camel
cigarettes 1:o children than to adults. 215 The available research shows that
during the first three years of the "Joe Camel" advertising campaign, the
proportion of youth smokers purchasing Camels rose from 0.5% to
32.8%.216 11n fact, children twelve to thirteen years old registered the
greatest recognition of advertising images.17 Not only is there informa-
213. See John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young
People to Start Smoking?, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991); Joseph R. DiFranza et al., R.JR
Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to Children, 266 JAMA
3149 (1991).
214. See Pierce, et al., supra note 213, at 3154.
215. See DiFranza, et al., supra note 213, at 3149. The objectives of the
study conducted by Joseph R. DiFranza, John W. Richards, Jr., M.D., Paul M.
Paulman, M.D., Nancy Wolf-Gillespie, M.A., Christopher Fletcher, M.D., Robert
D. Jaffe, M.D., David Murray, Ph.D. was to determine if R.J. Reynolds' cartoon-
theme advertising is more effective at promoting Camel cigarettes to children than
to adults. See id at 3149. The subjects of the study were high school students
from five regions of the United States as well as adults over the age of twenty-one
from Massachusetts. See id. The results of the study indicate that children were
better able to identify the tobacco product that was being advertised. See id Chil-
dren were more attracted to Camel cigarettes than adults. See id. Furthermore,
Camel's share of the market to children rose from 0.5% to 32.8%. See id,
216. Seeid at 3151.
217. See Pierce et al., supra note 213, at 3157. The participants of the
study conduc:ted by John D. Pierce, Ph.D., Elizabeth Gilpin, M.S., David M. Bums,
M.D., Elizabeth Whalen, M.A., Bradley Rosbrook, M.S., Donald Shopland, Mi-
chael Johnson, Ph.D., were 24,296 adults and 5,040 teenagers. See id at 3154.
The study was conducted using telephone survey data compared with data from a
1986 telephone survey study. See id
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tion that directly links increased advertising with increased sales, but
there is also evidence that shows children, in particular, are attracted and
vulnerable to advertising techniques used by the tobacco industry.218
Limiting the advertisement of tobacco products to black-and-white
background, text-only format, and eliminating characters like "Joe
Camel," may directly reduce the number of youth smokers.
d. The Fourth Prong Under Central Hudson
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied when it is
determined that the restrictions are not more extensive than necessary.
219
Regulations on commercial speech cannot completely suppress informa-
tion when a more narrowly tailored restriction would serve the state's
interest as effectively.
220
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions shaped the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test to make it easier for the states or Congress to regu-
late commercial speech. The Court held that the fourth prong of the test
only requires a reasonable fit between a state's interests and the means
chosen to advance those interests. 2 ' It is not necessary that the means be
the least restrictive means available nor must they be the best possible
restrictive measure. The chosen means need only be narrowly tailored. 2
The Posadas decision suggested that state and federal legislatures
have discretion in determining the appropriate measures to apply in ad-
vancing their interests. 23 Since Posadas, however, the Court has tried to
218. David A. Locke, Counterspeech as an Alternative to Prohibition:
Proposed Federal Regulation of Tobacco Promotion in American Motorsport, 70
IND. L.J. 217, 226 (1994).
219. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
220. See id at 565.
221. See Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469,480 (1989).
222. See id. (stating that there must be a fit between the legislature's means
and goals, "a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the
interest served') (citing, In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). The state is not
obligated to chose the least restrictive means available, but it must be narrowly
tailored. See id. The scope of the restriction must be reasonable, and does not need
to be perfectly targeted to address the harm intended to be regulated. See id
223. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) ("[I]t is precisely because the government could
have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissi-
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strengthen. the burden the legislatures have in justifying infringing free
speech. At issue in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,224 was a
city ordinance that refused to allow distribution of magazines that ad-
vertised adult educational, recreational, and social programs. 2"' The city
ordinance was prompted by the city's interest in the safety and attrac-
tiveness of streets and sidewalks.226 The Court held that it would not
adopt the lowest standard of review possible for evaluating the means
and ends of a restriction on commercial speech.227 The Court did, how-
ever, consider the availability of numerous less-burdensome alternatives
as a relevant factor in the determination of whether a reasonable fit ex-
ists between the state's interests and the means chosen to advance those
interests.2 8 Later, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 229 the Court decided
whether a federal law prohibiting a beer manufacturer from displaying
alcohol content on beer labels was constitutional." 0 The Court held that
the federal law failed the Central Hudson test,231 in part, because of the
availability of other alternatives that would advance the government's
interest of preventing beer companies from competing for the strongest
beer." 2 In fact, the Court noted that the availability of other options in-
dicated that the federal prohibition was more extensive than
necessary.
:!3
Many of the restrictions proposed by the Failed Settlement were more
extensive than necessary and, most likely, would have failed the fourth
prong. The government's interest of reducing youth smoking, albeit a
substantial one, could be achieved by less drastic means that would be
less burdensome on free speech. For example, the ban on all outdoor
advertising is a complete statutory ban that, most likely, would not sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny. In 44 Liquormart,234 the Court invalidated
ble for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but
reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.").
224. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
225. See id. at 412.
226. See id.
227. Seeid. at 417 n.13.
228. See id.
229. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
230. See id. at 478.
231. Seeid. at 491.
232. See id. at 490-91.
233. See id. at 49i.
234. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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the statutory ban on price advertising of alcoholic beverages because the
ban was a more extensive suppression than necessary on truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech. 235 Although commercial speech, in gen-
eral, receives less protection from the First Amendment than other types
of speech, the Court found the state could not establish a reasonable fit
between its interests and the means chosen.236 There were other alterna-
tive forms of regulation that could have achieved the state's goals.
237
The Court in 44 Liquormart enumerated several alternatives that
would not restrict commercial speech but would advance the state's in-
terest in promoting temperance.238 The Court suggested that the legisla-
ture could adopt other methods, such as raising prices, increasing taxes
and implementing educational programs, to decrease the consumption of
alcohol.2 9 It is likely that the Court will look to the identical alternatives
espoused in 44 Liquormart to argue that less burdensome alternatives
exist rather than banning all outdoor advertising.
Advertising restrictions must be carefully crafted to confine their fo-
cus to those areas of advertising that are most visible to children. For
example, prohibiting outdoor advertising within one thousand feet of
schools and public playgrounds may be a more practical solution.240 Or,
perhaps, another tailored restriction would be to impose the black-and-
white, text-only ban to publications whose teenage readership is close to
one hundred percent. These requirements would not deprive consuming
adults of the free flow of information. Information about the product
may be conveyed to interested consumers through words. Moreover,
advertisements with color and imagery would still be permitted to
flourish in adult publications and in adult locations.
235. The Court applied the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test and
determined that Rhode Island could not satisfy the requirement that speech restric-





240. This type of a restriction was suggested by the FDA in its Final Rule
on Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44399
(1996).
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D. Surviving Constitutional Analysis as a Time,
Place and Manner Restriction
Some of the restrictions may survive constitutional analysis as a
regulation of time, place, and manner. Generally, restrictions on time,
place, or manner do not infringe on an individual's First Amendment
rights and are valid restrictions on speech. 241 The Supreme Court utilizes
a three-part test to evaluate whether a time, place, or manner restriction
is valid.242 First, the restriction must be content-neutral in that it restricts
speech irrespective of the actual content of the expression.243 Second,
the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial govern-
mental interest.244 It must be shown that the substantial government in-
terest will be achieved less effectively without the regulation, and that
the means chosen to effectuate the governmental interest are not sub-
stantially broader than necessary.245 Finally, the restriction must not
block ample, alternative channels for communicating the information.
246
Other methods for expressing speech must be left open.
Rather than ban all outside advertising as suggested in the Failed Set-
tlement, a prohibition on outdoor advertising within one thousand feet of
schools and playgrounds may be a valid time, place, and manner restric-
tion. Although it may be argued that the restriction is not content-
neutral, at least tobacco manufacturers are left with numerous channels
to communicate information about their products.
Another suggestion is the requirement originating in the Failed Set-
tlement that advertising exposed to children be in black-text on a white
background. A restriction such as this does not prevent tobacco manu-
facturers from communicating information about their products to
adults, but it may be substantially broader than necessary. After all, the
241. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 160, at 1087.
242. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
243. See id. ("[R]estrictions of this kind [expression subject to time, place,
and manner restrictions] are valid provided that they are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech .... ."). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 160, at 1087 (stating that regulations must be content-neutral,
"[o]therwise the state would be able to cloak restrictions on speech itself in the
guise of regulations of the mode of speech or the place ... that is used for the
speech").
244. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
245. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 782-83.
246. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
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only publications exempted from the restrictions are those whose reader-
ship of eighteen years old or younger is fifteen percent or less but no
greater than two million people. Publications that have a low percentage
of youth readers, but do not meet the conditions to be exempted from the
restriction, will have to comply with the black-and-white, text-only ad-
vertisement. As a result, the First Amendment rights of adult readers to
receive information will be unprotected. In a publication with eighty-
percent of its readers older than eighteen, such a measure seems more
drastic than necessary.
E. Analyzing Whether the Restrictions are Tools Used by the
Government to Favor One Viewpoint Over Another
A restriction that passes the Central Hudson test or qualifies as a valid
time, place, and manner restriction, may, nonetheless, be struck down as
a viewpoint-based restriction. The government cannot discriminate
against an idea or perception because it may be dangerous to its listen-
ers.24 7 A certain viewpoint cannot be supported by imposing restrictions
on the opposite view. Whatever society's ideas and perceptions are, they
must be developed by a well-informed public and not by the govern-
ment.
The restrictions suggested in the Failed Settlement may be viewpoint-
based restrictions, and as such, deemed unconstitutional. Should similar
restrictions be imposed in the future, the government would be sup-
pressing information about tobacco products based on the content of the
messages. The federal government would be quashing the idea that
smoking is good. However, the opposite message, that smoking is bad,
would not be subject to any restriction. To illustrate, if an anti-tobacco
entity were to use a cartoon character to inform readers not to use to-
bacco products, their conduct would not fall within any of the restric-
tions on advertising. The restrictions in the Failed Settlement were im-
247. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th
Cir. 1985) aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) ("Under the First Amendment, the govern-
ment must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas."). At issue in American
Booksellers Ass'n was an anti-pornography civil rights ordinance. See id at 325-
26. The ordinance was struck down because it impermissibly discriminated on the
basis of point of view. See id. at 323. The court argued that "[o]ne of the things
that separates our society from [totalitarian governments] is our absolute right to
propogate opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful." See id at
328.
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posed on ihe tobacco manufacturers and distributors, but not on any or-
ganization that promotes anti-tobacco messages. While the tobacco
manufacturers would be restricted in conveying information about their
products to the public, anti-tobacco messages would be communicated
irrespective of any encumbrances a settlement may impose. Promoting
one viewpoint at the expense of another, through legislation, is precisely
what First Amendment case law in the area of viewpoint discrimination
was designed to prevent.
IV. GIVING THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
JURISDICTION OVER TOBACCO PRODUCTS AS A MEASURE TO
CONTROL TOBACCO USE
A. Bow the Failed Settlement Proposed to Grant Jurisdiction
to the Food and Drug Administration
One of the main features of the Failed Settlement, which sets it apart
from past federal legislation, was the provision granting authority to the
Food & Drug Administration.2 4 Under the Failed Settlement, tobacco
products would have been treated as "drug devices"249 under a separate
chapter within the FDA's enabling statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).25° In other words, the FDA would have authority
over tobacco by way of a new chapter devoted to regulating tobacco
products that would have been inserted in the FDCA.25'
248. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. §§ 141, 142 (1997).
249. Although the title of section 142 was "Treatment of Tobacco Products
as Drugs," section 142 (d) stated that, under the proposed bill, tobacco products
were to be classified as a class II device. See id §§ 142, 142(d); see also infra note
268 (defining "drug device" under the FDCA). A class II device is defined under
the FDCA as:
A device which cannot be classified as a class I device because the
general controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reason-
able assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device, and
for which there is sufficient information to establish special con-
trols i o provide such assurance, including the promulgation of per-
formance standards, postmarket surveillence,. . . development and
dissemination of guidelines,.., recommendations, and other ap-
propriate actions as the Secretary deems necessary to provide such
assurmce.
21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(1)(B) (1994).
250. See infra Part IV.B.
251. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 143 (stating that the FDCA is amended by
adding a new chapter entitled "'Chapter IX - TOBACCO PRODUCTS').
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One purpose in giving the FDA control over tobacco was to promote
the development of safer tobacco products by creating a regulatory
scheme to reduce the level of certain ingredients, like nicotine.52 To-
bacco manufacturers would have been subjected to performance stan-
dards that would have resulted in a reduction of health risks from the use
of tobacco products. 253 The performance standards would have included
provisions forcing manufacturers to change the composition of their
products to decrease illness or injury that may be inflicted. 5 4 Other pro-
visions that concerned the construction, composition, and ingredients of
tobacco products would also have been required. 25 5 An advisory com-
mittee would have been established, called the "Scientific Advisory
Committee," to assist in the development of proper performance stan-
dards.256 The members of the advisory committee would have included
experts in medicine, science, and other fields that involve the manufac-
ture and use of tobacco products.
257
The Failed Settlement also contained a provision encouraging the de-
velopment of a less hazardous tobacco product. 258 Should the manufac-
turing of a safer product be technologically feasible, tobacco manufac-
turers would have been forced to produce and distribute a less hazardous
product.259 This section also provided financial grants and other con-
tracts to manufacturers to develop safer products if such financial sup-
252. See id. § 143 (referring to section 902 of the chapter that would have
been devoted to the regulation of tobacco products under the Failed Settlement).
253. See id § 143(3) (referring to section 905 entitled "Performance Stan-
dards for Tobacco Products").
254. See id. (referring to section 905(b)(1)).
255. See id. (referring to section 905(b)(2)).
256. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 143 (referring to section 906(a), which
addressed the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee).
257. See id. (referring to section 906(b), which addressed how the Scien-
tific Advisory Committee would be staffed).
258. See id. (referring to section 908 entitled "Reduced Risk Products").
259. See id. (referring to section 908(d)(2) and specifying that the Com-
missioner of the FDA woulddetermine that a less hazardous product is technologi-
cally feasible). According to the Failed Settlement, a manufacturer would have
been able to elect not to manufacture the less hazardous product at the demand of
the FDA Commissioner. See id. (referring to section 908(d)(3)(B)). The manu-
facturer had to provide notice to the Commission and the manufacturer had to pro-
vide the technology at a reasonable price so the less hazardous product could be
manufactured. See id. (referring to section 908(d)(3)(B)).
Measures to Control Tobacco Use
port were necessary.
260
The Industry would have been compelled to disclose a list of the in-
gredients contained in their products.261 At a minimum, tobacco pack-
aging would have contained a list of all the contents of the ingredients
so that the public would be made aware of the product's contents.262 It
was also required that within five years of the Failed Settlement's en-
actment, cach manufacturer would submit a safety assessment for each
ingredient based on scientific evidence.263 If any ingredient was disap-
proved, it would have been prohibited by the FDA in the manufacturing
process.26I
B. What is the FDA ?
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Ace 65 was enacted in 1938 as
the enabling statute creating the Food & Drug Administration.266 The
FDCA defines the scope of power the FDA has over drugs2 67 and drug
delivery devices. 268 Through the FDCA, the FDA regulates the distribu-
260. See id. (referring to section 908(d)(4)).
261. See S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 143 (referring to section 910 entitled
"Disclosure: and Reporting of Nontobacco Ingredients").
262. See id. (referring to sections 910(a)(1)(A), (B) and noting that the list
would have included everything that is added to the tobacco as well as a description
of the quanity of each ingredient, substance or compound that comprise the list).
263. See id. (referring to sections 910(b)(1), (2)).
264. See id. (referring to section 910 (c) (1) (B)).
265. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
266. An enabling statute is the statute from which an administrative
agency gets its powers. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a) (1994) (granting the power to the FDA to "promulgate
regulations for the efficient enforcement of this chapter").
267. See 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g)(1). The FDCA defines drugs as:
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmaco-
poeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States,
or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other anima-s; and
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any
tncmtion of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles in-
tended for use as a component of any article specified in clause
(A):. (B), or (C).
268. See 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(h). The FDCA defines device as:
[A]a instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, im-
plant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, includin
any component, part, or accessory, which is recognized in the ofi-
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tion and manufacturing of drugs and drug delivery devices by examining
and approving new drugs, 269 defining specific products as drugs,270 and
imposing civil and criminal penalties for violations of the FDCA. 21,
C. Is Congress the Only Governmental Body Permitted to
Grant Jurisdiction to the FDA, or Can the FDA Exert its
Own Jurisdiction?
Although Congress has never conferred authority to the FDA over
tobacco products, 272 the FDA, as well, has consistently maintained that it
did not have jurisdiction over tobacco products. 3 According to the
FDCA, the FDA has authority over drugs or devices if they are manu-
cial National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or
any supplement to them, intended for use in the diagnosis of dis-
ease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or intended to af-
ect the structure or any function of the body of man or other ani-
mals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for
the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
Id.
269. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994).
270. See id. § 321.
271. See id.
272. See generally supra Part I (describing federal legislation enacted by
Congress directed towards tobacco products).
273. See Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) filed a petition with the FDA re-
questing that the Agency assert jurisdiction over cigarettes. See id. at 237. ASH
alleged that cigarettes fall within the FDA's jurisdiction because cigarettes are
articles other than food intended to affect the structure or a function of the body.
See id (quoting the pertinent part of the definition of "drug" that ASH believes
cigarettes fall under, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1976)). Because the FDA refused
to deem cigarettes a drug unless specific health claims were made by the manufac-
turers or distributors, the FDA Commissioner, Donald Kennedy, rejected ASH's
request. See id. The FDA Commissioner noted that ASH presented no evidence to
show that the manufacturers or vendors of cigarettes intended to affect the structure
or a function of the body. See id. at 239. Dr. Charles C. Edwards testified at a
Senate Hearing in which he stated that "cigarettes recommended for smoking
pleasure are beyond the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." Public Health
Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings on S. 1454 Before the Consumer Sub-
committee of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Congress, 2d Session 239
(1972).
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factured with the intent to affect the function or structure of the body."'
Intent to manufacture a product that fits under this definition of "drug"
or "device" may be proven by subjective claims made by cigarette ven-
dors, or objective evidence such as contents of the labeling, promotional
materials:, or advertising.2 7 5 As a result, in the past the Agency would
only inteirvene when manufacturers made express health claims about
their products.276 Without such evidence, the FDA was unwilling to ex-
ert its control.
The trend changed in August 1995, when the FDA issued regulations
governing the access and promotion of tobacco products.277 In general,
the regulations restricted the sale and distribution of tobacco products. 278
274. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(l)(C), (h) (1994).
275. "Clearly, it is well-established 'that the 'intended use' of a product is
determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional claims, advertising,
and any other relevant sources."' Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 239
(quoting Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540 F.2d
947 (8th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. 46 Cartons, more or less, containing
Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.C.N.J. 1953) (stating that "[t]he
manufactuer of the article, through his representations in connection with its sale,
can determine the use to which the article is to be put."); United States v. 354 Bulk
Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847, 849-50 (D.C.N.J.
1959) (estblishing that the cigarettes fell under the FDA's drug jurisdiction by
looking at, inter alia, the label on the packaging, the directions on the packaging,
display cards used for advertising, television, and radio commercials).
276. United States v. 46 Cartons, more or less, containing Fairfax Ciga-
rettes, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.C.N.J. 1953), involved the dissemination of leaflets that
suggested that the cigarettes accompanying the leaflets were effective at preventing
respiratory diseases and other diseases, like pneumonia, influenza, and tuberculo-
sis. See id at 337. It was held that the tobacco products were "drugs" as defined
under the FDA and, as such, could be seized by the FDA. See id at 339. Although
the court acknowledged that the manufacturer may not have believed it was selling
drugs, the leaflet gives the public the idea that the cigarettes could be used for the
prevention of certain illnesses. See id. at 338. The court determined this was
enough to bring it within the definition of "drug" as espoused in the FDCA. See id.
at 239. In United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes,
178 F. Supp. 847 (D.C.N.J. 1959), the cigarettes were marketed as products to
reduce apptite. See id at 849-50. Since the Trim cigarette was intended to affect
the structure and functions of the human body by reducing the appetites of its con-
sumers, the court determined that the products came under the FDA's jurisdiction
under the FDCA's definition of"drug" See id at 851.
277. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (1996).
278. See id. at 44399 (outlining the provisions of the regulations restricting
sale and distribution of cigarettes).
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Predicated on the FDA's jurisdiction to control cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco as drug devices, 79 the FDA determined that the nicotine in to-
bacco products affects the structure or function of the body.20 This indi-
cates that nicotine causes and sustains addiction while acting as a
stimulant, sedative, and weight reducer.2 8'
Although the FDA recognized tobacco as the leading cause of pre-
ventable death among Americans, 282 it was concerned that millions of
people are addicted to tobacco products that have been legally on the
market for years.28 3 Based on this concern, the FDA concluded that the
best course of action would not be to focus primarily on curbing the
habits of those already addicted. Rather, the FDA's purpose should be to
minimize the number of people that become addicted. 284 Because most
smokers in the U.S. began using tobacco before the age of eighteen, the
FDA focused its regulations and restrictions on children.
285
Some of the restrictions the FDA promulgated include: (I) requiring
retailers to verify that purchasers are at least eighteen years of age, 28 6 (2)
restricting the sale of cigarettes from vending machines,287 (3) restricting
tobacco companies from selling or distributing promotional items, such
as tee-shirts and baseball caps, that have a logo or other identifiers of
tobacco products, 28 8 (4) requiring that advertising visible to children be
on black-and-white, text-only format,28 9 and (5) prohibiting billboards
and other outdoor advertising within one thousand feet of schools and
playgrounds.
290
Regardless of whether a settlement is enacted into law, Congress has
the power to grant explicit control over tobacco products to the FDA.29
279. See id. at 44396-97.
280. See id at 44397 (concluding that "[c]igarettes and smokeless tobacco
are combination products consisting of the drug nicotine and device components
intended to deliver nicotine to the body.").
281. See id.
282. See id at 44398.
283. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44398.
284. See id. at 44398-99.
285. See id. at 44399.
286. See id.
287. See id (stating that this restriction does not apply in facilities where
individuals under eighteen are not permitted at any time).
288. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44399.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (granting to Congress the power to
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Congress could enact legislation that would allow the FDA to regulate
without the Industry's approval. Although Congress did not express its
intent to hiave the FDA control tobacco products,2 9 2 it may be the only
governmental body with the vested authority to do so. The FDA's
authority to exert its own jurisdiction was challenged in Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Administration,293 and the out-
come was not promising for the Agency.294 The Fourth Circuit addressed
whether the FDA could regulate tobacco products based upon its own
interpretaiion of the FDCA. In opposing the regulations, tobacco manu-
facturers, retailers, and advertisers argued that the FDA does not have
jurisdiction over tobacco products.295 They alleged that (1) Congress
withheld jurisdiction from the FDA, and (2) the FDCA does not permit
the FDA to regulate tobacco products as either drugs or drug-delivery
devices. 29'; The FDA argued that it has authority to regulate tobacco
products because tobacco products fit within the literal definitions of
"drugs" an.d "devices" as defined in the FDCA.297 Because the FDA is
responsible for regulating "drugs" and "devices," it would be reasonable
to conclude that it would have authority over tobacco products. 298 The
court agreed that tobacco products may fit under the literal definitions of
"drug" and "drug-delivery device."299 However, the Fourth Circuit held
that Congress did not intend for tobacco products to come within the
FDCA's definition of "drug" or "device.,, 300 The literal definitions must
be examined by looking at the language of the FDCA as well as the
control commerce).
292. See supra Part I.
293. See 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
294. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 958 F.
Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C. 1997) rev'd sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
295. See Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 159.
296. See id.
297. See id at 160 (outlining the FDA's argument for asserting jurisdiction
over tobacco as evinced in the Final Rule published in the Federal Register, 61 Fed.
Reg. 44396. (1996)).
298. See id.
299. See Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 163 ("A mechanical reading of
only the definitions provisions may appear to support the government's position
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structure of the Act as a whole.30 1 The court inferred that Congress did
not intend for the FDA to regulate tobacco because tobacco products
could not meet the conditions of safety and effectiveness that are man-
dated by the FDCA. 0 2 Moreover, the fact that Congress did not enact
legislation that would have granted jurisdiction to the FDA, but did en-
act bills giving other agencies the authority to regulatq specific areas in
tobacco manufacturing and distribution, was significant in deciding that
the FDA exceeded its authority.
303
D. Is Giving the FDA Jurisdiction Over Tobacco
Products a Wise Decision?
Giving the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products would be one of
the best measures to regulate the Industry and tobacco products. There
are many reasons why giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products is a good measure to control tobacco use. First of all, the FDA
will be prepared to effectuate Congress' goal of developing a regulatory
scheme that focuses on the manufacturing and distribution of tobacco
products. 304 The FDA issued its Final Rule which specifically focuses on
regulating the manufacturing and distribution of tobacco products.305
Yet, it was not announced until the FDA considered numerous responses
and comments from the public on the subject of regulating tobacco.
Several issues and concerns presented from the public were evaluated,
addressed, and examined thoroughly in its published analysis for the
Final Rule.30 6 Such an exhaustive exposition of the issues involved indi-
cates that the FDA is prepared to handle the complex task of regulating
301. See id
302. See id. at 166-67.
303. See id at 170-71.
304. See S. 1415, 105th Cong § 143 (1997) (referring to section 902 which
would have been implemented in the Failed Settlement bill if enacted).
305. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44396.
306. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44420. "Some comments suggested that if
the Government begins regulating tobacco, it will soon regulate many other con-
sumer products that are now legal, but judged to be harmful to health, including
alcohol and caffeine." Id "Many comments... argued that the tobacco industry is
already intensely regulated, and that more regulation is unneeded and unjustified."
Id. "[A] [s]ection ... of this document provides responses to questions raised
about the constitutionality of the regulations." Id at 44466. "FDA received thou-
sands of comments about how smoking was an issue of free choice for adults." Id
at 44418.
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tobacco. The Agency is aware of the public's concerns surrounding the
regulation of tobacco, and it will, more than likely, incorporate the pub-
lic's concerns in whatever regulations it imposes.
A second reason why giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco
would be a wise decision is because the Agency would exercise good
judgment in effectuating the goal of decreasing tobacco use without
abusing it~s discretion. Although it would be premature to predict that the
Agency would implement the provisions from the Final Rule should it
be given authority over tobacco, they serve, nonetheless, as a good indi-
cator of the -FDA's motives.3 0 7 The provisions in the Final Rule were
specific and detailed. Instead of restricting the sale of tobacco products
to the gerLeral public, for example, the FDA wanted to simply restrict the
sale of tobacco products to children. The FDA confined its own author-
ity to a limited scope by focusing on children as opposed to exerting
authority through broad, overreaching' provisions that may infringe
harshly on the rights of adult smokers.30 s Although the power to regulate
an industry as powerful as the tobacco industry is a great amount of
authority allocated to one agency, the FDA is aware of its limitations
and its goals.
30 9
Despite the encouraging potential for a decrease in the amount of to-
bacco use in the United States should the FDA receive authority over
tobacco, there are two concerns that this grant of authority may raise.
1. Thre First Concern: Will Granting Jurisdiction to the FDA
Overreach its Boundaries?
The purpose behind the creation of the FDA may be frustrated if it is
given authority to regulate tobacco products. Under the FDCA, all drugs
and drug.delivery devices marketed to the public have to be safe and
effective for use.310 In fact, FDA Deputy Commissioner William B.
Schultz stated that a fundamental principle of drug and device regulation
is that all drugs and devices are proven safe and effective before they are
307. See supra Part IV.C.
308. See id.
309. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44398 ("In determining the best course of action,
the [A]gency considered the highly addictive nature of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco and the fact that these products have previously been lawfully marketed to
millions oftadult Americans.").
310. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994) (requiring new drugs to meet conditions
of safety and efficacy); Id. § 360c(a)(2) (requiring devices to meet conditions of
safety and efficacy).
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marketed.32 ' Yet, the FDA states that tobacco products are dangerous
and unsafe. There are no health benefits achieved by using tobacco
products, and more than 400,000 people each year die as a result of to-
bacco use. 3
Despite the FDA's findings on the dangers of tobacco use, a ban on
tobacco products has never been promoted. The FDA adamantly argued
in its Final Rule that a complete ban on tobacco products is not a meas-
ure that would best serve the public interest.314 Proper medical treatment
is not currently available to care for the millions of smokers experienc-
ing withdrawal if a ban were enacted. 5 The FDA also recognized that a
black market could emerge and force a stronger, more dangerous to-
bacco product to be manufactured.316 Furthermore, the FDA found that
prohibition is unnecessary because the imposed regulations will inhibit
the spread of smoking behavior from one generation to the next.317 As
current smokers die or quit, they will be replaced by fewer new
smokers.
3 1 8
The refusal by Congress and the FDA to propose a ban on tobacco
products directly conflicts with the FDCA and the purposes of the FDA.
Because cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, as they are currently mar-
keted, are unsafe, they would be deemed unapproved new drug devices
if marketed. Congress may need to exempt tobacco products from the
safe and effective condition if it chooses to give the FDA jurisdiction.
Although doing so would frustrate a fundamental principle of the FDA,
it would be far more detrimental if the FDA were forced to impose a ban
on tobacco products.
2. The Second Concern: Providing for the Development of a Less
Hazardous Product
The drafters of the Failed Settlement devoted an entire subsection to
discussing how the development of a safer tobacco product will be
311. See Statement by William B. Schultz, before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., at 8 (Feb. 22, 1996).
312. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396,44398 (1996).
313. See id.
314. Seeid. at 44418-19.
315. See id. at44398.
316. See id.
317. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44418-19.
318. Seeid.
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regulated .3 19 There remains, however, little incentive for the tobacco
companies to develop a safer product on their own initiative. Although
tobacco manufacturers may be required to produce a less hazardous
product, they ultimately have the choice of whether or not to actually
modify and market the product. 320 Provided a manufacturer gives ade-
quate notice to the FDA and agrees to make the technology available at
a reasonable price, the manufacturer may exercise its own discretion in
determining whether to develop the less hazardous product.32' Further-
more, the Failed Settlement did not posit any regulation forcing the In-
dustry to research and test for a less hazardous product, nor did it sug-
gest any possibility that the FDA, itself, would adopt a mechanism for
the creation of a safer product.
322
Although tobacco manufacturers may be in the best position to know
how to develop a safer product, allowing the manufacturers the option of
not creating a less hazardous product calls for the FDA to rely com-
pletely ori manufacturers to develop a safer cigarette. Such a policy is
ludicrous because it assumes that the tobacco industry will be honest
and forthcoming in disclosing information about new technology. This
is not a realistic expectation when the tobacco industry has been decep-
tive in the past.323 To prevent history repeating itself, the government
should be wary of leaving it to the discretion of the Industry to disclose
information about its activities and manufacturing processes. The In-
dustry may not want to manufacture a safer product out of its desire to
maintain the demand for its products as they are currently manufactured.
Moreover, evidence that a safer cigarette may be manufactured could be
324used against the Industry in subsequent tort litigation. Developing a
safer product may cause a jury to infer that traditional cigarettes were
negligently manufactured, and as a result, the tobacco industry will be
liable.




323. See supra Part II.D.3 (referring to the tobacco industry's awareness of
the addictive nature of cigarettes and its attempts to conceal it from the public, as
well as the tobacco industry's interest in children when evaluating marketing
strategies).
324. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 51, at 1340.
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V. SUMMATION
Legislation, whether through a settlement between the Industry and
Congress or by Congress acting on its own accord, needs to be imple-
mented to control tobacco use in the United States. This Comment ana-
lyzed three significant measures that were contemplated by members of
the Industry and Congress during negotiations over the Failed Settle-
ment.325 Each measure would be effective, to some degree, at controlling
tobacco use. However, the best measure is giving the FDA jurisdiction
to regulate the manufacturing and distribution of tobacco products.
The primary reason FDA regulation is the best measure to adopt is
because the other two measures, the grant of immunity and advertising
restrictions, are unworkable solutions. Granting the Industry immunity
will only permit it to avoid paying millions of dollars in restitution to
individuals that suffer from tobacco-induced diseases. 326 The success of
future lawsuits is promising, especially in light of the documents that
have been released detailing the Industry's attempts to attract and addict
smokers.327 Should the Industry refuse to settle without an immunity
provision given to them, then Congress should forego any settlement
negotiations with the Industry, and simply legislate measures to control
tobacco.
Congress should not use restrictions on advertising as the primary
method of legislation. The analysis of the restrictions contained in the
Failed Settlement demonstrates that any ban or prohibition must go
through exhaustive constitutional review.328 Congress could promulgate
limited, narrowly tailored restrictions, such as a ban on billboards within
one thousand feet of schools or black-and-white, text-only in publica-
tions that have greater-than-majority readership of teenagers. Yet, even
these measures may not withstand constitutional scrutiny under the
fourth prong of a First Amendment analysis under Central Hudson.
Even assuming, arguendo, that any advertising restriction would pass
constitutional muster under Central Hudson, it may be deemed uncon-
stitutional as an invalid time, place,,and manner restriction or fail as a
restriction based on viewpoint discrimination.
Instead, the primary channel of regulations should come from the
FDA, and Congress should not hesitate to grant authority to control to-
325. See supra Parts II, III, IV.
326. See supra Part II.D.4.
327. See supra Part II.D.3.
328. See supra Part III.
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bacco to the FDA. As analyzed in this Comment, the proposals that gave
the FDA authority to regulate tobacco under the Failed Settlement
should be effective.329 The measures are geared toward developing a
less-hazardous product, and they demand that the tobacco manufacturers
be held to strict performance standards.33° Manufacturers would be made
to reveal the contents of their products, and a Scientific Advisory Com-
mittee would be created as an advisor to the FDA.33'
The tobacco manufacturers would be forced to work with the govern-
ment through the FDA. This would be an unprecedented measure for an
industry that was uncontrolled to a great extent by the government for
years.332 I: may be the only workable alternative available, and it may be
the only one this country needs.
CONCLUSION
Tobacco use is a serious threat to the public health, and measures
controlling its use must be implemented to decrease the incidence of
tobacco-related death and disease. Although legislation controlling to-
bacco has been implemented since the mid-1960s, it has been largely
ineffective. After all, death from tobacco use still remains the single-
leading cause of preventable death in this country today.
Measure's similar to those pronounced in this Comment will have a
significant effect on the level of death and disease from tobacco use.
Regardless of whether the Industry settles with the federal government,
each measure described in this Comment will significantly alter the way
tobacco companies manufacture and distribute their products. Some
measures will be more effective than others. Yet, at a minimum, this
Comment encourages future discussions on the issue of controlling to-
bacco use in the efforts of significantly decreasing the amount of deaths
from tobacco-induced diseases.
EPILOGUE
At the publication of this Comment, four of the biggest tobacco manu-
facturers, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lor-
illard settled with forty-six states that initiated suits to recover Medicaid
329. See supra Part IV.
330. See supra Part IV.A.
331. See id.
332. See supra Part I.
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costs related to smoking.333 The deal includes a $206 billion payout over
the next twenty-five years and ends one of the biggest legal challenges
that faced the Industry.334 This new settlement is only a first step, how-
ever, in the fight to control tobacco use in this country. The settlement is
solely concerned with resolving the state-initiated suits. It does not in-
volve implementing any federal legislation designed to control tobacco.
It does not include giving jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products to the
FDA, nor does it provide immunity to the manufacturers against other
pending suits. 335 Restrictions on advertising are imposed, however, any
such restriction still needs to pass constitutional muster to be effective
against the Industry. 336 The tobacco manufacturers may accede to re-
stricting their advertising, yet, a waiver of this sort does not preclude the
tobacco consuming public from asserting a violation of the First
Amendment.
Any negotiation the government has with members of the Industry is a
hopeful and encouraging venture. It is crucial, however, that the gov-
ernment realize that it cannot stop there. Whatever monetary settlement
members of the Industry propose to the states, collectively or individu-
ally, should not obstruct the vision of the federal government in con-
tinuing the move toward adopting measures to effectively control the
use of tobacco.
Christina F. Pinto
333. See Saundra Tony & John Schwartz, States Approve $206 Billion
Deal with Big Tobacco, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al.
334. See Tony & Schwartz, supra note 33, at Al.
335. See id. at A7.
336. See id. at Al.
